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Abstract. A program is non-interferent if it leaks no secret information to an
observable output. However, non-interference is too strict in many practical cases
and quantitative information flow (QIF) has been proposed and studied in depth.
Originally, QIF is defined as the average of leakage amount of secret informa-
tion over all executions of a program. However, a vulnerable program that has
executions leaking the whole secret but has the small average leakage could be
considered as secure. This counter-intuition raises a need for a new definition
of information leakage of a particular run, i.e., dynamic leakage. As discussed
in [5], entropy-based definitions do not work well for quantifying information
leakage dynamically; Belief-based definition on the other hand is appropriate for
deterministic programs, however, it is not appropriate for probabilistic ones.
In this paper, we propose new simple notions of dynamic leakage based on entropy
which are compatiblewith existingQIF definitions for deterministic programs, and
yet reasonable for probabilistic programs in the sense of [5]. We also investigated
the complexity of computing the proposed dynamic leakage for three classes of
Boolean programs. We also implemented a tool for QIF calculation using model
counting tools for Boolean formulae. Experimental results on popular benchmarks
of QIF research show the flexibility of our framework. Finally, we discuss the
improvement of performance and scalability of the proposed method as well as
an extension to more general cases.
Keywords: Quantitative information flow · Hybrid monitor · Dynamic leakage.
1 Introduction
Researchers have realized the importance of knowing where confidential information
reaches by the execution of a program to verify whether the program is safe. The non-
interference property, namely, any change of confidential input does not affect public
output, was coined in 1982 by Goguen and Meseguer [14] as a criterion for the safety.
This property, however, is too strict in many practical cases, such as password verifica-
tion, voting protocol and averaging scores. A more elaborated notion called quantitative
information flow (QIF) [23] has been getting much attention of the community. QIF is
defined as the amount of information leakage from secret input to observable output.
The program can be considered to be safe (resp. vulnerable) if this quantity is negligible
(resp. large). QIF analysis is not easier than verifying non-interference property because
if we can calculate QIF of a program, we can decide whether it satisfies non-interference
or not. QIF calculation is normally approached in an information-theoretic fashion to
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2 B. T. Chu et al.
consider a program as a communication channel with input as source, and output as
destination. The quantification is based on entropy notions including Shannon entropy,
min-entropy and guessing entropy [23]. QIF (or the information leakage) is defined as
the remaining uncertainty about secret input after observing public output, i.e., the mu-
tual information between source and destination of the channel. Another quantification
proposed by Clarkson, et al. [11], is the difference between ‘distances’ (Kullback-Leibler
divergence) from the probability distribution on secret input that an attacker believes in
to the real distribution, before and after observing the output values.
WhileQIF is about the average amount of leaked information over all observable outputs,
dynamic leakage is about the amount of information leaked by observing a particular
output. Hence, QIF is aimed to verify the safety of a program in a static scenario in
compile time, and dynamic leakage is aimed to verify the safety of a specific running of
a program. So which of them should be used as a metric to evaluate a system depends
on in what scenario the software is being considered.
Example 1.
if source < 16 then output ← 8 + source
else output ← 8
In Example 1 above, assume source to be a positive integer, then there are 16 possible
values of output, from 8 to 23. While an observable value between 9 and 23 reveals
everything about the secret variable, i.e., there is only one possible value of source
to produce such output, a value of 8 gives almost nothing, i.e., there are so many
possible values of source which produce 8 as output. Taking the average of leakages
on all possible execution paths results in a relatively small value, which misleads us
into regarding that the vulnerability of this program is small. Therefore, it is crucial
to differentiate risky execution paths from safe ones by calculating dynamic leakage,
i.e., the amount of information can be learned from observing the output which is
produced by a specific execution path. But, as discussed in [5], any of existing QIF
models (either entropy based or belief tracking based) does not always seem reasonable
to quantify dynamic leakage. For example, entropy-based measures give sometimes
negative leakage. Usually, we consider that the larger the value of the measure is, the
more information is leaked, and in particular, no information is leaked when the value is
0. In the interpretation, it is not clear howwe should interpret a negative value as a leakage
metric. Actually, [5] claims that the non-negativeness is a requirement for a measure of
dynamic QIF. Also, MONO, one of the axioms for QIF in [2] turns out to be identical
to this non-negative requirement. Belief-based one always give non-negative leakage
for deterministic programs but it may become negative for probabilistic programs. In
addition, the measure using belief model depends on secret values. This would imply
(1) even if a same output value is observed, the QIF may become different depending
on which value is assumed to be secret, which is unnatural, and (2) a side-channel may
exist when further processing is added by system managers after getting quantification
result. Hence, as suggested in [5], it is better to introduce a new notion for quantifying
dynamic leakage caused by observing a specific output value.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold.
Quantifying Dynamic Leakage 3
– We present our criteria for an appropriate definition of dynamic leakage and propose
two notions that satisfy those criteria. We propose two notions because there is a
trade-off between the easiness of calculation and the preciseness (see Section 2).
– Complexity of computing the proposed dynamic leakages is analyzed for three
classes of Boolean programs.
– By applying model counting of logical formulae, a prototype was implemented and
feasibility of computing those leakages is discussed based on experimental results.
According to [5], we arrange three criteria that a ‘good’ definition of dynamic leakage
should satisfy, namely, the measure should be (R1) non-negative, (R2) independent of a
secret value to prevent a side channel and (R3) compatible with existing notions to keep
the consistency within QIF as a whole (both dynamic leakage and normal QIF). Based
on those criteria, we come up with two notions of dynamic leakage QIF1 and QIF2,
where both of them satisfy all (R1), (R2) and (R3). QIF1, motivated by entropy-based
approach, takes the difference between the initial and remaining self-information of the
secret before and after observing output as dynamic leakage. On the other hand, QIF2
models that of the joint probability between secret and output. Because both of them are
useful in different scenarios, we studied these two models in parallel in the theoretical
part of the paper. We call the problems of computing QIF1 and QIF2 for Boolean
programs CompQIF1 and CompQIF2, respectively. For example, we show that even for
deterministic loop-free programs with uniformly distributed input, both CompQIF1 and
CompQIF2 are ]P-hard. Next, we assume that secret inputs of a program are uniformly
distributed and consider the following method of computing QIF1 and QIF2 (only for
deterministic programs for QIF2 by the technical reason mentioned in Section 4): (1)
translate a program into a Boolean formula that represents relationship among values
of variables during a program execution, (2) augment additional constraints that assign
observed output values to the corresponding variables in the formula, (3) count models
of the augmented Boolean formula projected on secret variables, and (4) calculate
the necessary probability and dynamic leakage using the counting result. Based on this
method,we conducted experiments using our prototype toolwith benchmarks taken from
QIF related literatures, in which programs are deterministic, to examine the feasibility
of automatic calculation. We also give discussion, in subsection 5.3, on difficulties and
possibilities to deal with more general cases, such as, of probabilistic programs. In step
(3), we can flexibly use any off-the-shelf model counter. To investigate the scalability of
this method, we used four state-of-the-art counters, SharpCDCL [15] andGPMC [24,32]
for SAT-based counting, an improved version of aZ3 [22] for SMT-based counting, and
DSharp-p [20,30] for SAT-based counting in d-DNNF fashion. Finally, we discuss the
feasibility of automatic calculation of the leakage in general case.
Related work The very early work on computational complexity of QIF is that of
Yasuoka and Terauchi. They proved that even the problem of comparing QIF of two
programs, which is obviously not more difficult than calculating QIF, is not a k-safety
property for any k [27]. Consequently, self-composition, a successful technique to
verify non-interference property, is not applicable to the comparison problem. Their
subsequent work [28] proves a similar result for bounding QIF, as well as the PP-
hardness of precisely quantifying QIF in all entropy-based definitions for loop-free
Boolean programs. Chadha and Ummels [9] show that the QIF bounding problem of
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recursive programs is not harder than checking reachability for those programs. Despite
given those evidences about the hardness of calculating QIF, for this decade, precise QIF
analysis gathers much attention of the researchers. In [15], Klebanov et al. reduce QIF
calculation to ]SAT problem projected on a specific set of variables as a very first attempt
to tackle with automating QIF calculation. On the other hand, Phan et al. reduce QIF
calculation to ]SMT problem for utilizing existing SMT (satisfiability modulo theory)
solver. Recently, Val et al. [25] reported a method that can scale to programs of 10,000
lines of code but still based on SAT solver and symbolic execution. However, there is
still a gap between such improvements and practical use, and researchers also work on
approximatingQIF. Köpf andRybalchenko [16] propose approximatedQIF computation
by sandwiching the precise QIF by lower and upper bounds using randomization and
abstraction, respectively with a provable confidence. LeakWatch of Chothia et al. [10],
also give approximation with provable confidence by executing a program multiple
times. Its descendant called HyLeak [7] combines the randomization strategy of its
ancestor with precise analysis. Also using randomization but in Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) manner, Biondi et al. [6] utilize ApproxMC2, an existing model counter
created by some of the co-authors. ApproxMC2 provides approximation on the number
of models of a Boolean formula in CNF with adjustable precision and confidence.
ApproxMC2 uses hashing technique to divide the solution space into smaller buckets
with almost equal number of elements, then count the models for only one bucket and
multiply it by the number of buckets. As for dynamic leakage, McCamant et al. [17]
consider QIF as network flow through programs and propose a dynamic analysis method
that can work with executable files. Though this model can scale to very large programs,
its precision is relatively not high. Alvim et al. [2] give some axioms for a reasonable
definition of QIF to satisfy and discuss whether some definitions of QIF satisfy the
axioms. Note that these axioms are for static QIF measures, which differ from dynamic
leakage. However, given a similarity between static and dynamic notions, we investigated
how our new dynamic notions fit in the lens of the axioms (refer to Section 2).
Dynamic information flow analysis (or taint analysis) is a bit confusing term that does
not mean an analysis of dynamic leakage, but a runtime analysis of information flow.
Dynamic analysis can abort a program as soon as an unsafe information flow is detected.
Also, hybrid analysis has been proposed for improving dynamic analysis that may abort
a program too early or unnecessarily. In hybrid analysis, the unexecuted branches of
a program is statically analyzed in parallel with the executed branch. Among them,
Bielova et al. [4] define the knowledge κ(z) of a program variable z as the information
on secret that can be inferred from z (technically, κ(z)−1(v) is the same of the pre-image
of an observed value v of z, defined in Section 2). In words, hybrid analysis updates the
‘dynamic leakage’ under the assumption that the programmay terminate at eachmoment.
Our method is close to [4] in the sense that the knowledge κ(z)−1(v) is computed. The
difference is that we conduct the analysis after the a program is terminated and v is
given. We think this is not a disadvantage compared with hybrid analysis because the
amount of dynamic leakage of a program is not determined until a program terminates
in general.
Structure of the remaining parts: Section 2 is dedicated to introduce new notions, i.e.,
QIF1 and QIF2, of dynamic leakage and some properties of them. The computational
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complexity of CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 gives
details on calculating dynamic leakage based on model counting. Experimental results
and discussion are provided in Section 5 and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 New Notions for Dynamic Leakage
The standard notion for static quantitative information flow (QIF) is defined as the
mutual information between random variables S for secret input and O for observable
output:
QIF = H(S) − H(S |O) (1)
where H(S) is the entropy of S and H(S |O) is the expected value of H(S |o), which is the
conditional entropy of S when observing an output o. Shannon entropy and min-entropy
are often used as the definition of entropy, and in either case, H(S)−H(S |O) ≥ 0 always
holds by the definition.
In [5], the author discusses the appropriateness of the existing measures for dynamic
QIF and points out their drawbacks, especially, each of these measures may become
negative. Hereafter, let S and O denote the finite sets of input values and output values,
respectively. Since H(S |O) = ∑o∈O p(o)H(S |o), [5] assumes the following measure
obtained by replacing H(S |O) with H(S |o) in (1) for dynamic QIF:
QIFdyn(o) = H(S) − H(S |o). (2)
However, QIFdyn(o) may become negative even if a program is deterministic (see
Example 2). Another definition of dynamic QIF is proposed in [11] as
QIFbelie f ( Ûs, o) = DKL(p Ûs | |pS) − DKL(p Ûs | |pS |o) (3)
where DKL is KL-divergence defined as DKL(p| |q) = ∑s∈S p(s) log p(s)q(s) , and p Ûs(s) = 1
if s = Ûs and p Ûs(s) = 0 otherwise. Intuitively, QIFbelie f ( Ûs, o) represents how closer
the belief of an attacker approaches to the secret Ûs by observing o. For deterministic
programs, QIFbelie f ( Ûs, o) = − log p(o) ≥ 0 [5]. However, QIFbelie f may still become
negative if a program is probabilistic (see Example 3).
Let P be a program with secret input variable S and observable output variable
O. For notational convenience, we identify the names of program variables with the
corresponding random variables. Throughout the paper, we assume that a program
always terminates. The syntax and semantics of programs assumed in this paper will
be given in the next section. For s ∈ S and o ∈ O, let pSO(s, o), pO |S(o|s), pS |O(s |o),
pS(s), pO(o) denote the joint probability of s ∈ S and o ∈ O, the conditional probability
of o ∈ O given s ∈ S (the likelihood), the conditional probability of s ∈ S given o ∈ O
(the posterior probability), the marginal probability of s ∈ S (the prior probability) and
the marginal probability of o ∈ O, respectively. We often omit the subscripts as p(s, o)
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and p(o|s) if they are clear from the context. By definition,
p(s, o) = p(s |o)p(o) = p(o|s)p(s), (4)
p(o) =
∑
s∈S
p(s, o), (5)
p(s) =
∑
o∈O
p(s, o). (6)
We assume that (the source code of) P and the prior probability p(s) (s ∈ S) are
known to an attacker. For o ∈ O, let preP(o) = {s ∈ S | p(s |o) > 0}, which is called the
pre-image of o (by the program P).
Considering the discussions in the literature, we aim to define new notions for
dynamic QIF that satisfy the following requirements:
(R1) Dynamic QIF should be always non-negative because an attacker obtains some
information (although sometimes very small or even zero) when he observes an
output of the program.
(R2) It is desirable that dynamic QIF is independent of a secret input s ∈ S. Otherwise,
the controller of the system may change the behavior for protection based on the
estimated amount of the leakage that depends on s, which may be a side channel for
an attacker.
(R3) The new notion should be compatible with the existing notions when we restrict
ourselves to special cases such as deterministic programs, uniformly distributed
inputs, and taking the expected value.
The first proposed notion is the self-information of the secret inputs consistent with
an observed output o ∈ O. Equivalently, the attacker can narrow down the possible
secret inputs after observing o to the pre-image of o by the program. We consider the
self-information of s ∈ S after the observation as the probability of s divided by the
sum of the probabilities of the inputs in the pre-image of o (see the upper part of Fig. 1).
QIF1(o) = − log(
∑
s′∈preP (o)
p(s′)). (7)
The second notion is the self-information of the joint events s′ ∈ S and an observed
output o ∈ O (see the lower part of Fig. 1). This is equal to the the self-information of o.
QIF2(o) = − log(
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, o)) (8)
= − log p(o) = − log p(s, o) + log p(s |o). (9)
Both notions are defined by considering how much possible secret input values are
reduced by observing an output. We propose two notions because there is a trade-off
between the easiness of calculation and the appropriateness. As illustrated in Example
3, QIF2 can represent the dynamic leakage more appropriately than QIF1 in some cases.
On the other hand, the calculation of QIF1 is easier than QIF2 as discussed in Section
4. Both notions are independent of the secret input s ∈ S (Requirement (R2)).
0 ≤ QIF1(o) ≤ QIF2(o). (10)
Quantifying Dynamic Leakage 7
If we assume Shannon entropy,
QIF = −
∑
s∈S
p(s) log p(s)
+
∑
o∈O
p(o)
∑
s∈S
p(s |o) log p(s |o) (11)
= −
∑
s∈S
p(s) log p(s)
+
∑
s∈S,o∈O
p(s, o) log p(s |o). (12)
If a program is deterministic, for each s ∈ S, there is exactly one os ∈ O such that
p(s, os) = p(s) and p(s, o) = 0 for o , os , and therefore
QIF =
∑
s∈S,o∈O
p(s, o)(− log p(s, o) + log p(s |o)). (13)
Comparing (9) and (13), we see that QIF is the expected value of QIF2, which suggests
the compatibility of QIF2withQIF (Requirement (R3)) when a program is deterministic.
Also, if a program is deterministic, QIFbelie f ( Ûs, o) = − log p(o), which coincides with
QIF2(o) (Requirement (R3)). By (10), Requirement (R1) is satisfied. Also in (10),
QIF1(o) = QIF2(o) holds for every o ∈ O if and only if the program is deterministic.
Theorem 1. If a program P is deterministic, for every o ∈ O and s ∈ S,
QIFbelie f (s, o) = QIF1(o) = QIF2(o) = − log p(o).
If input values are uniformly distributed, QIF1(o) = log |S ||preP (o) | for every o ∈ O. uunionsq
     
 ′

    
 ′
     
 ′

    

Fig. 1. QIF1 (the upper) and QIF2 (the lower)
Let us get back to the Example 1 in the previous section to see how new notions
convey the intuitive meaning of dynamic leakage. We assume: both source and output
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are 8-bit numbers of which values are in 0..255, source is uniformly distributed over
this range. Then, because the program in this example is deterministic, as mentioned
above QIF1 coincides with QIF2. We have QIF1(output = 8) = − log 241256 = 0.087bits
while QIF1(output = o) = − log 1256 = 8bits for every o between 9 and 23. This result
addresses well the problem of failing to differentiate vulnerable output from safe ones
of QIF.
Example 2. Consider the following program taken from Example 1 of [5]:
if S = s1 then O ← a else O ← b
Assume that the probabilities of inputs are p(s1) = 0.875, p(s2) = 0.0625 and p(s3) =
0.0625. Then, we have the following output and posterior probabilities:
p(a) = 0.875, p(b) = 0.125
p(s1 |a) = 1, p(s2 |a) = p(s3 |a) = 0
p(s1 |b) = 0, p(s2 |b) = p(s3 |b) = 0.5
Ifwe use Shannon entropy,H(S) = 0.67,H(S |a) = 0 andH(S |b) = 1. Thus,QIFdyn(b) =
−0.33, which is negative as pointed out in [5].Also,QIF2(a) = − log p(a) = − log 0.875 =
0.19 and QIF2(b) = − log p(b) = − log 0.125 = 3. QIF2(a) < QIF2(b) reflects the fact
that the difference of the posterior and the prior of each input when observing b is
larger (s1 : 0.875 → 0, s2, s3 : 0.0625 → 0.5) than observing a (s1 : 0.875 → 1,
s2, s3 : 0.0625→ 0).
Since the program is deterministic, QIFbelie f (s, o) = QIF1(o) = QIF2(o).
o a b
QIFdyn(o) 0.67 −0.33
QIF2(o) 0.19 3
uunionsq
Example 3. The next program is quoted from Example 2 of [5] where c1 r []1−r c2 means
that the program chooses c1 with probability r and c2 with probability 1 − r .
if S = s1 then O ← a 0.81[]0.19O ← b
else O ← a 0.09[]0.91O ← b
Assume that the probabilities of inputs are p(s1) = 0.25 and p(s2) = 0.75. (p(a), p(b)) =
(0.25, 0.75)
(
0.81 0.19
0.09 0.91
)
= (0.27, 0.73) and the posterior probabilities are calculated by
(4) as:
p(s1 |a) = 0.75, p(s2 |a) = 0.25
p(s1 |b) = 0.065, p(s2 |b) = 0.935
Let us use Shannon entropy for QIFdyn. As H(S) = H(S |a) = −0.25 log 0.25 −
0.75 log 0.75, QIFdyn(a) = H(S)−H(S |a) = 0. As already discussed in [5], QIFdyn(a) =
0 though an attacker may think that S = s1 is more probable by observing O = a. For
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each o ∈ {a, b}, QIFbelie f (s, o) takes different values (one of them is negative) depend-
ing on whether s = s1 or s2 is the secret input. QIF2(a) = − log p(a) = − log 0.27 = 1.89
and QIF2(b) = − log p(b) = − log 0.73 = 0.45. QIF1(a) = QIF1(b) = 0 because the
set of possible input values does not shrink whichever a or b is observed. Similarly
to Example 2, QIF2(a) > QIF2(b) reflects the fact that the probability of each input
when observing a varies more largely (s1 : 0.25→ 0.75, s2 : 0.75→ 0.25) than when
observing b (s1 : 0.25 → 0.065, s2 : 0.75 → 0.935). In this example, the number |S|
of input values is just two, but in general, |S| is larger and we can expect |preP(o)| is
much smaller than |S| and QIF1 serves a better measure for dynamic QIF.
o a b
QIFdyn(o) 0 0.46
QIFbelie f (s1, o) 1.58 −1.94
QIFbelie f (s2, o) −1.58 0.32
QIF1(o) 0 0
QIF2(o) 1.89 0.45
A program is non-interferent if for every o ∈ O such that p(o) > 0 and for every s ∈ S,
p(o) = p(o|s). Assume a program P is non-interferent. By (4), p(s) = p(s |o) for every
o ∈ O (p(o) > 0) and s ∈ S, then QIF = 0 by (11). If P is deterministic in addition,
p(o) = p(o|s) = 1 for o ∈ O (p(o) > 0) and s ∈ S. That is, if a program is deterministic
and non-interferent, it has exactly one possible output value.
Relationship to the hybrid monitor Let us see how our notions relate to the knowledge
tracking hybrid monitor proposed by Bielova et al. [4].
Example 4. Consider the following program taken from Program 5 of [4]:
if h then z← x + y
else z← y - x;
output z
where h is a secret input, x and y are public inputs and z is a public output.
In [4], the knowledge about secret input h carried by public output z is κ(z) =
λρ.if ([[h]]ρ, [[x + y]]ρ, [[y − x]]ρ) where ρ is an initial environment (an assignment
of values to h, x and y) and [[e]]ρ is the evaluation of e in ρ. If h = 1, x = 0
and y = 1, then z = 1. In [4], to verify whether this value of z reveals any in-
formation about h in this setting of public inputs (i.e., x = 0, y = 1), they take
κ(z)−1(1) = {ρ|if ([[h]]ρ, [[x + y]]ρ, [[y − x]]ρ) = 1} = {ρ|if ([[h]]ρ, 1, 1) = 1}. Because
if ([[h]]ρ, 1, 1) = 1 for every ρ, [4] concluded that z = 1 in that setting leaks no informa-
tion.
On the other hand, with that settings of x = 0 and y = 1, given z = 1 as the
observed output, h can be either true or f alse. For the program is deterministic,
QIF1(z = 1) = QIF2(z = 1) = − log∑p(s′ |o)>0 p(s′) = − log(p(h = true) + p(h =
f alse)) = − log 1 = 0, which is consistent with that of [4] though the approach looks
different. Actually, the function κ(z) encodes all information revealed from a value of z
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about secret input. By applying κ(z)−1 for a specific value o of z, we get the pre-image
of o. In other words, κ(z)−1(o) is exactly what we are getting toward quantifying our
notions of dynamic leakage. The monitor proposed in [4] tracks the knowledge about
secret input carried by all variables along an execution of a program according to the
inlined operational semantics. It seems, however, impractical to store all the knowledge
during an execution, and furthermore, it would take time to compute the inverse of the
knowledge when an observed output is fixed.
The three requirements (R1), (R2) and (R3) we presented summarize the intuitions
about dynamic leakage following the spirit of [5]. However, those requirements lack of
a firm back-up theory, whilst in [2] Alvim et al. provide a set of axioms for QIF. Despite
there is difference between QIF and dynamic leakage, we investigated how well our
notions fit in the lens of those axioms to confirm their feasibility to be used as a metric.
For the limitations of space, we will skip detailed explanation for the quite trivial results.
(1) For prior vulnerability, both QIF1 and QIF2 satisfy CONTINUITY, CONVEXITY
(also the loosen version Q-CONVEXITY).
(2) For posterior vulnerability, exactly speaking, we cannot construct the channel ma-
trix C, because dynamic leakage is about one specific output value but the matrix is
for all possibilities. Hence, conceptually, those axioms are not applicable in this con-
text. However, by capturing the intuitive interpretation of the axioms, we made a small
modification (i.e., to use DY → R+ in stead of D2X → R+ as the type of poste-
rior vulnerability) to investigate the new notions under the spirit of axioms. So, by
definitions above and the meaning of posterior vulnerability in terms of [2], we have
p(s)∑
s′∈preP (o) p(s′)
and p(s |o) are respectively formulae for V̂(o) in the context of QIF1
and QIF2. Given this modification, we found that QIF1 satisfies all the three axioms:
NI (Non-Interference), MONO (Monotonicity) and DPI (Data Processing Inequality)
whilst QIF2 satisfies only the first two axioms but the last one, DPI. In fact, QIF2 still
aligns well to DPI in cases for deterministic programs, and only misses for probabilistic
ones. Please recall that in deterministic cases, QIF1 ≡ QIF2 by Theorem 1. Hence,
for deterministic programs, QIF2 satisfies DPI because QIF1 does. For it is quite triv-
ial and the space is limited, we will omit the proof of those satisfaction. In stead, we
will give a counterexample to show that QIF2 does not satisfy DPI when programs are
probabilistic. Let P1 : {s1, s2} → {u1, u2} and P2 : {u1, u2} → {v1} inwhich P2 is a post-
process of P1. Also assume the following probabilities: p(s1) = p(s2) = 0.5, p(u1 |s1) =
0.1, p(u2 |s1) = 0.9, p(u1 |s2) = 0.3, p(u2 |s2) = 0.7 and p(v1 |u1) = p(v1 |u2) = 1, in
which s1, s2, u1, u2, v1 annotate events that the corresponding variables have those val-
ues. Given these settings, we have V̂(u1) = p(s1 |u1) = 0.5×0.10.5×0.1+0.5×0.3 = 0.25, and
V̂(v1) = p(s1 |v1) = 0.5×0.1+0.5×0.90.5×0.1+0.5×0.9+0.5×0.3+0.5×0.7 = 0.5. In other words, V̂(v1) > V̂(u1),
which is against to DPI.
It turns out that our proposed notions either satisfy straightly or through some adap-
tive transformation, i.e., the type of posterior vulnerability, for all the axioms except
DPI. ForDPI, we came to the conclusion that it is not suitable as a criterion to verify if a
dynamic leakage notion is reasonable. It is because dynamic leakage is about a specific
execution path, in which the inequality ofDPI does no longer make sense, rather than the
average on all possible execution paths. Therefore, it is not counter-intuitive that QIF2
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does not satisfy DPI for probabilistic programs while QIF2 for deterministic programs
and QIF1 satisfy DPI.
3 Complexity Results
3.1 Program model
Let B = {>,⊥} be the set of truth values, N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of natural numbers
andN0 = N∪{0}. Also letQ denote the set of rational numbers.We assume probabilistic
Boolean programswhere every variable stores a truth value and the syntactical constructs
are assignment to a variable, conditional, probabilistic choice, while loop, procedure
call and sequential composition:
e ::= > | ⊥ | X | ¬e | e ∨ e | e ∧ e
c ::= skip | X ← e | if e then c else c end
| c r []1−r c | while e do c end | pi(®e; ®X) | c; c
where X stands for a (Boolean) variable, r is a constant rational number such that
0 ≤ r ≤ 1. In the above BNFs, objects derived from the syntactical categories e and c
are called expressions and commands, respectively.
A procedure pi has the following syntax:
in ®X; out ®Y ; local ®Z; c
where ®X, ®Y, ®Z are sequences of input, output and local variables, respectively (which
are disjoint from one another). Let Var(pi) = {V | V appears in ®X, ®Y or ®Z}. We will
use the same notation Var(e) and Var(c) for an expression e and a command c. A
program is a tuple of procedures P = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pik) where pi1 is the main procedure.
P is also written as P( ®S, ®O) to emphasize the input and output variables ®S and ®O of
pi1 = in ®S; out ®O; local ®Z; c.
A command X ← e assigns the value of Boolean expression e to variable X . A
command c1 r []1−r c2 means that the program chooses c1 with probability r and c2 with
probability 1 − r . Note that this is the only probabilistic command. A command pi(®e; ®X)
is a recursive procedure call to pi with actual input parameters ®e and return variables ®X .
The semantics of the other constructs are defined in the usual way.
The size of P is the sum of the number of commands and the maximum number of
variables in a procedure of P.
If a program does not have a recursive procedure call and k = 1, it is called a (non-
recursive) while program. If a while program does not have a while loop, it is called a
loop-free program (or straight-line program). If a program does not have a probabilistic
choice, it is deterministic.
3.2 Assumption and overview
We define the problems CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 as follows.
12 B. T. Chu et al.
Inputs: a probabilistic Boolean program P,
an observed output value o ∈ O, and
a natural number j (in unary) specifying the error bound.
Problem: Compute QIF1(o) (resp. QIF2(o)) for P and o.
(General assumption)
(A1) The answer to the problem CompQIF1 (resp. CompQIF2) should be given as a
rational number (two integer values representing the numerator and denominator)
representing the probability
∑
s′∈preP (o) p(s′) (resp. p(o)).
(A2) If a program is deterministic or non-recursive, the answer should be exact. Oth-
erwise, the answer should be within j bits of precision, i.e., | (the answer) −∑
s′∈preP (o) p(s′)(resp. p(o)) | ≤ 2−j .
If we assume (A1), we only need to perform additions and multiplications the number
of times determined by an analysis of a given program, avoiding the computational
difficulty of calculating the exact logarithm. The reason for assuming (A2) is that the
exact reachability probability of a recursive program is not always a rational number
even if all the transition probabilities are rational (Theorem 3.2 of [13]).
When we discuss lower-bounds, we consider the corresponding decision problem by
adding a candidate answer of the original problem as a part of an input. The results on
the complexity of CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 are summarized in Table 1. As mentioned
above, if a program is deterministic, QIF1 = QIF2.
Table 1. Complexity results
programs deterministic probabilisticCompQIF1 CompQIF2
loop-free
PSPACE PSPACE PSPACE
]P-hard (Theorem 2) (Theorem 2)
(Proposition 1) ]P-hard ]P-hard
while
PSPACE-comp PSPACE-comp EXPTIME
(Proposition 2) (Theorem 3) (Theorem 4)
PSPACE-hard
recursive
EXPTIME-comp EXPSPACE EXPSPACE
(Proposition 3) (Theorem 5) (Theorem 5)
EXPTIME-hard EXPTIME-hard
Recursive Markov chain (abbreviated as RMC) is defined in [13] by assigning a
probability to each transition in recursive state machine (abbreviated as RSM) [1].
Probabilistic recursive program in this paper is similar to RMC except that there is no
program variable in RMC. If we translate a recursive program into an RMC, the number
of states of the RMC may become exponential to the number of Boolean variables in
the recursive program. In the same sense, deterministic recursive program corresponds
to RSM, or equivalently, pushdown systems (PDS) as mentioned and used in [9]. Also,
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probabilistic while program corresponds to Markov chain. We will review the definition
of RMC in Section 3.6.
3.3 Deterministic case
We first show lower bounds for deterministic loop-free, while and recursive programs.
For deterministic recursive programs, we give EXPTIME upper bound as a corollary of
Theorem 5.
Proposition 1. CompQIF1(= CompQIF2) is ]P-hard for deterministic loop-free pro-
grams even if the input values are uniformly distributed.
(Proof) We show that ]SAT can be reduced to CompQIF1 where the input values
are uniformly distributed. It is necessary and sufficient for CompQIF1 to compute the
number of inputs ®s such that p(®s | ®o) > 0 because ∑p(®s | ®o)>0 p(®s) = |{®s ∈ ®S | p(®s | ®o) >
0}|/| ®S|. For a given propositional logic formula φ with Boolean variables ®S, we just
construct a program P with input variables ®S and an output variable O such that the
value of φ for ®S is stored toO. Then, the result of CompQIF1 with P and o = > coincides
with the number of models of φ. uunionsq
Proposition 2. CompQIF1(= CompQIF2) is PSPACE-hard for deterministic while pro-
grams.
(Proof) The proposition can be shown in the same way as the proof of PSPACE-hardness
of the non-interference problem for deterministic while programs by a reduction from
quantified Boolean formula (QBF) validity problem given in [9] as follows. For a given
QBF ϕ, we construct a deterministic while program P having one output variable such
that P is non-interferent if and only if ϕ is valid as in the proof of Proposition 19 of [9].
The deterministic program is non-interferent if and only if the output of the program is
always>, i.e., p(>) = 1. Thus, we can decide if φ is valid by checking whether p(>) = 1
or not for the deterministic program, the output value >, and the probability 1. uunionsq
Proposition 3. CompQIF1(= CompQIF2) is EXPTIME-complete for deterministic re-
cursive programs.
(Proof) EXPTIME upper bound can be shown by translating a given program to a
pushdown system (PDS). Assume we are given a deterministic recursive program P and
an output value o ∈ O. We apply to P the translation to a recursive Markov chain (RMC)
A in the proof of Theorem 5. The size of A is exponential to the size of P. Because P
is deterministic, A is also deterministic; A is just a recursive state machine (RSM) or
equivalently, a PDS. It is well-known [8] that the pre-image of a configuration c of a
PDS A preA(c) = {c′ | c′ is reachable to c in A} can be computed in polynomial time
by so-called P-automaton construction. Hence, by specifying configurations outputting
o as c, we can compute preP(o) = preA(c) in exponential time.
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The lower bound can be shown in the same way as the EXPTIME-hardness proof of
the non-interference problem for deterministic recursive programs by a reduction from
the membership problem for polynomial space-bounded alternating Turing machines
(ATM) given in the proof of Theorem 7 of [9]. From a given polynomial space-bounded
ATM M and an input word w to M , we construct a deterministic recursive program P
having one output variable such that P is non-interferent if and only if M accepts w as
in [9]. As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can reduce to CompQIF1 instead of reducing
to the non-interference problem. uunionsq
3.4 Loop-free programs
We show upper bounds for loop-free programs. For CompQIF2, the basic idea is sim-
ilar to the one in [9], but we have to compute the conditional probability p(®o|®s). For
CompQIF1, ]PNP upper bound can be obtained by a similar result on model counting
if the input values are uniformly distributed.
Theorem 2. CompQIF1 andCompQIF2 are solvable in PSPACE for probabilistic loop-
free programs. CompQIF1 is solvable in ]PNP if the input values are uniformly dis-
tributed.
(Proof) We first show that CompQIF2 is solvable in PSPACE for probabilistic loop-free
programs. If a program is loop-free, we can compute p( ®o|®s) for every ®s in the same way
as in [9], multiply it by p(®s) and sum up in PSPACE. Note that in [9], it is assumed that a
program is deterministic and input values are uniformly distributed, and hence it suffices
to count the input values ®s such that p(®o|®s) = 1, which can be done in PCH3. In contrast,
we have to compute the sum of the probabilities of p(®s)p(®o|®s) for all ®s ∈ ®S. We can
easily see that CompQIF1 is solvable in PSPACE for probabilistic loop-free programs
in almost the same way as CompQIF2. Instead of summing up p(®s)p(®o|®s) for all ®s ∈ ®S,
we just have to sum up p(®s) for all ®s ∈ ®S such that p(®o|®s) > 0 (if and only if p(®s | ®o) > 0).
Next, we show that CompQIF1 is solvable in ]PNP if the input values are uniformly
distributed. As stated in the proof of Proposition 1, in this case, CompQIF1 can be solved
by computing the number of inputs s such that p(®s | ®o) > 0. Deciding p(®s | ®o) > 0 for a
given probabilistic loop-free program P can be reduced to the satisfiability problem of a
propositional logic formula. Note that for any probabilistic choice like X ← c1 r []1−r c2
with 0 < r < 1, we just have to treat it as a non-deterministic choice like X = c1 or X = c2
because all we need to know is whether p(®s | ®o) > 0. We construct from P a formula φ
with Boolean variable corresponding to input and output variables of P and intermediate
variables. Here, we abuse the symbols ®S and ®O, which are used for the variables of P,
also as the Boolean variables corresponding to them, respectively. The formula φ is
constructed such that φ ∧ ®S = ®s ∧ ®O = ®o is satisfiable if and only if p(®s | ®o)> 0 for ®s and
®o. Thus, the number of inputs ®s such that p(®s | ®o) > 0 is the number of truth assignments
for ®S such that φ ∧ ®O = ®o is satisfiable, i.e., the number of projected models on ®S. This
counting can be done in ]PNP because projected model counting is in ]PNP [3]. uunionsq
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3.5 While programs
We show upper bounds for while programs. For CompQIF1, we reduce the problem to
the reachability problem of a graph representing the state reachability relation. An upper
bound for CompQIF2 will be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 5.
Theorem 3. CompQIF1 is PSPACE-complete for probabilistic while programs.
(Proof) It suffices to show that QIF1 is solvable in PSPACE for probabilistic while
programs. QIF1 for probabilistic while programs is reduced to the reachability problem
of graphs that represents the reachability among states of P. We construct a directed
graphG from a given program P as follows. Each node (l, σ) onG uniquely corresponds
to a location l on P and an assignment σ for all variables in P. An edge from (l, σ)
to (l ′, σ′) represents that if the program is running at l with σ then, with probability
greater than 0, it can transit to l ′ with σ′ by executing the command at l. Deciding the
reachability from a node to another node can be done in nondeterministic log space
of the size of the graph. The size of the graph is exponential to the size of P due to
exponentially many assignments for variables. We see that p(®s | ®o) > 0 if and only if there
are two nodes (ls, σs) and (lo, ρo) such that ls is the initial location, lo is an end location,
σs( ®S) = ®s, σo( ®O) = ®o, and (lo, ρo) is reachable from (ls, σs) in G. Thus, p(®s | ®o) > 0 can
be decided in PSPACE, and also
∑
p(®s | ®o)>0 p(®s) can be computed in PSPACE. uunionsq
Theorem 4. CompQIF2 is solvable in EXPTIME for probabilistic while programs.
(We postpone the proof until we show the result on recursive programs.) uunionsq
3.6 Recursive programs
As noticed in the end of Section 3.1, we will use recursive Markov chain (RMC) to give
upper bounds of the complexity of CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 for recursive programs
because RMC has both probability and recursion and the complexity of the reachability
probability problem for RMC was already investigated in [13].
Recursive Markov chains A recursive Markov chain (RMC) [13] is a tuple A =
(A1, . . . , Ak) where each Ai = (Ni, Bi,Yi, Eni, Exi, δi) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a component graph
(or simply, component) consisting of:
– a finite set Ni of nodes,
– a set Eni ⊆ Ni of entry nodes, and a set Exi ⊆ Ni of exit nodes,
– a set Bi of boxes, and a mappingYi : Bi → {1, . . . , k} from boxes to (the indices of)
components. To each box b ∈ Bi , a set of call sites Callb = {(b, en) | en ∈ EnYi (b)}
and a set of return sites Retb = {(b, ex) | ex ∈ ExYi (b)} are associated.
– δi is a finite set of transitions of the form (u, pu,v, v) where
• the source u is either a non-exit node u ∈ Ni\Exi or a return site.
• the destination v is either a non-entry node v ∈ Ni\Eni or a call site.
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• pu,v ∈ Q is a rational number between 0 and 1 representing the transition
probability from u to v. We require for each source u,
∑
{v′ |(u,pu, v′,v′)∈δi } pu,v′ =
1. We write u
pu, v→ v instead of (u, pu,v, v) for readability. Also we abbreviate
u
1→ v as u→ v.
Intuitively, a box bwithYi(b) = j denotes an invocation of component j from component
i. There may be more than one entry node and exit node in a component. A call site
(b, en) specifies the entry node from which the execution starts when called from the
box b. A return site has a similar role to specify the exit node.
Let Qi = Ni ∪⋃b∈Bi (Callb ∪ Retb), which is called the set of locations of Ai . We
also let N =
⋃
1≤i≤k Ni , B =
⋃
1≤i≤k Bi , Y =
⋃
1≤i≤k Yi where Y : B → {1, . . . , k},
δ =
⋃
1≤i≤k δi and Q =
⋃
1≤i≤k Qi .
The probability pu,v of a transition u
pu, v→ v is a rational number represented by a
pair of non-negative integers, the numerator and denominator. The size of pu,v is the
sum of the numbers of bits of these two integers, which is called the bit complexity of
pu,v .
The semantics of an RMC A is given by the global (infinite state) Markov chain
MA = (V,∆) induced from A where V = B∗ × Q is the set of global states and ∆ is the
smallest set of transitions satisfying the following conditions:
(1) For every u ∈ Q, (ε, u) ∈ V where ε is the empty string.
(2) If (α, u) ∈ V and u pu, v→ v ∈ δ, then (α, v) ∈ V and (α, u) pu, v→ (α, v) ∈ ∆.
(3) If (α, (b, en)) ∈ V with (b, en) ∈ Callb , then (αb, en) ∈ V and (α, (b, en)) →
(αb, en) ∈ ∆.
(4) If (αb, ex) ∈ V with (b, ex) ∈ Retb , then (α, (b, ex)) ∈ V and (αb, ex) → (α, (b, ex)) ∈
∆.
Intuitively, (α, u) is the global state where u is a current location and α is a pushdown
stack, which is a sequence of box names where the right-end is the stack top. (2) defines
a transition within a component. (3) defines a procedure call from a call site (b, en); the
box name b is pushed to the current stack α and the location is changed to en. (4) defines
a return from a procedure; the box name b at the stack top is popped and the location
becomes the return site (b, ex). For a location u ∈ Qi and an exit node ex ∈ Exi in the
same component Ai , let q∗(u,ex) denote the probability of reaching (ε, ex) starting from
(ε, u) 1. Also, let q∗u =
∑
ex∈Exi q
∗
(u,ex). The reachability probability problem for RMCs
is the one to compute q∗(u,ex) within j bits of precision for a given RMC A, a location u
and an exit node ex in the same component of A and a natural number j in unary.
The following property is shown in [13].
Proposition 4. The reachability probability problem forRMCs can be solved inPSPACE.
Actually, q∗(u,ex) can be computed for every pair of u and ex simultaneously in PSPACE
by calculating the least fixpoint of the nonlinear polynomial equations induced from a
given RMC. uunionsq
1 Though we usually want to know q∗(en,ex) for an entry node en, the reachability probability is
defined in a slightly more general way.
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Results
Theorem 5. CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 are solvable in EXPSPACE for probabilistic
recursive programs.
(Proof) We will prove the theorem by translating a given program P into a recursive
Markov chain (RMC) whose size is exponential to the size of P. By Proposition 4, we
obtain EXPSPACE upper bound. Because an RMC has no program variable, we expand
Boolean variables in P to all (reachable) truth-value assignments to them. A while
command is translated into two transitions; one for exit and the other for while-body. A
procedure call is translated into a box and transitions connecting to/from the box. For
the other commands, the translation is straightforward.
Let P = (pi1, . . . , pik) be a given program. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Val(pii) be the set of
truth value assignments toVar(pii). We will use the same notationVal(e) andVal(c) for
an expression e and a command c. For an expression e and an assignment θ ∈ Val(e),
we write eθ to denote the truth value obtained by evaluating e under the assignment θ.
For an assignment θ and a truth value c, let θ[X ← c] denote the assignment identical
to θ except θ[X ← c](X) = c. We use the same notation for sequences of variables ®X
and truth values ®c as θ[ ®X ← ®c].
We construct the RMC A = (A1, . . . , Ak) from P where each component graph Ai =
(Ni, Bi,Yi, Eni, Exi, δi) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is constructed from pii = in ®X; out ®Y ; local ®Z; ci as
follows.
– Eni = {(ci, θ) | θ ∈ Val(pii) where θ(W) is arbitrary for
W ∈ ®X and θ(W) = ⊥ forW ∈ ®Y ∪ ®Z}.
– Exi = {σ | σ is an assignment to ®Y }.
– Ni , Bi , Yi and δi are constructed as follows.
(1) Ni ← Eni , Bi ← ∅, Yi ← the function undefined everywhere, δi ← {(skip, θ) →
θ |®Y | θ ∈ Val(pii)} where θ |®Y is the restriction of θ to ®Y . Note that θ |®Y ∈ Exi .
(2) Repeat the following construction until all the elements in Ni are marked:
Choose an unmarked (c, θ) from Ni , mark it and do one of the followings according
to the syntax of c.
(i) c = X ← e; c′. Add (c′, θ[X ← eθ]) to Ni and add (c, θ) → (c′, θ[X ← eθ]) to
δi .
(ii) c = if e then c1 else c2 end; c′. Add (c1; c′, θ) to Ni and add (c, θ) → (c1; c′, θ)
to δi if eθ = >. Add (c2; c′, θ) to Ni and add (c, θ) → (c2; c′, θ) to δi if eθ = ⊥.
(iii) c = c1 r []1−r c2; c′. Add (c1; c′, θ) and (c2; c′, θ) to Ni . Add (c, θ) r→ (c1; c′, θ)
and (c, θ) 1−r→ (c2; c′, θ) to δi .
(iv) c = while e do c1 end; c′. Add (c′, θ) to Ni and add (c, θ) → (c′, θ) to δi if
eθ = ⊥. Add (c1; c, θ) to Ni and add (c, θ) → (c1; c, θ) to δi if eθ = >.
(v) c = pij( ®e′; ®X ′); c′ where pij =
in ®X ′′; out ®Y ′′; local ®Z ′′; cj . Define Yi(b) = j. Add a new box b to Bi . Add
(c, θ) → (b, (cj,⊥[ ®X ′′ ← ®e′θ])) to δi where the assignment ⊥ denotes the one
that assigns ⊥ to every variable. For every σ ∈ Exj ,
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Fig. 2. Construction of an RMC from a recursive program
add (c′, θ[ ®X ′ ← ®Y ′′σ]) to Ni and add (b, σ) → (c′, θ[ ®X ′ ← ®Y ′′σ]) to
δi (see Fig. 2).
The number |Q | of locations of the constructed RMC A is exponential to the size of P.
More precisely, |Q | is in the order of the number of commands in P multiplied by 2N
where N is the maximum number of variables appearing in a procedure of P because
we construct locations of A by expanding each variable to two truth values. Recall that
both QIF1(o) and QIF2(o) can be computed by calculating p(o|s′) for each s′ ∈ S, i.e.,
the reachability probability from s′ to o. By Proposition 4, the reachability probability
problem for RMCs are in PSPACE, and hence CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 are solvable
in EXPSPACE. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 4 Let P be a given probabilistic while program and o ∈ O is an
output value. Our algorithm works as follows.
1. Compute preP(o).
2. Calculate
∑
s′∈S p(s′)p(o|s′) (see (9)).
In the proof of Theorem 5, a given program P is translated into a recursiveMarkov chain
Awhose size is exponential to the size of P. If a given program P is a while program, A is
an ordinary (non-recursive) Markov chain. The constraint on the stationary distribution
vector of A is represented by a system of linear equations whose size is polynomial
of the size of A (see [19] for example) and the system of equations can be solved in
polynomial time. Hence CompQIF2 is solvable in EXPTIME.
4 Model counting-based computation of dynamic leakage
In the previous section, we show that the problems of calculating dynamic leakage,
i.e., CompQIF1 and CompQIF2, are computationally hard. We still, however, propose a
practical solution to these problems by reducing them to model counting problems.
Reduction to model countingModel counting is a well-known and powerful technique
in quantitative software analysis and verification including QIF analysis. In existing
studies, QIF calculation has been reduced to model counting of a logical formula using
SAT solver [15] or SMT solver [22]. Similarly, we are showing that it is possible to
reduce CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 to model counting in some reasonable assumptions.
Let us consider what is needed to compute based on their definitions (7) and (9), i.e.,
QIF1 = − log(∑p(s′ |o)>0 p(s′)) and QIF2 = − log(∑s′∈S p(s′)p(o|s′)).
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For calculating QIF1 for a given output value o, it suffices (1) to enumerate input
values s′ that satisfy p(s′ |o) > 0 (i.e., possible to produce o), and (2) to sum the prior
probabilities over the enumerated input values s′. (2) can be computed from the prior
probability distribution of input values, which is reasonable to assume. When input
values are uniformly distributed, only step (1) is needed because QIF1 is simplified to
log |S ||preP (o) | by Theorem 1.
Let us consider QIF2. For deterministic programs, QIF1 = QIF2 holds (Theorem
1). For probabilistic programs, we need to compute the conditional probability p(o|s′)
for each s′, meaning that we have to examine all possible execution paths. We would
leave CompQIF2 for probabilistic programs as future work.
Given a program P together with its prior probability distribution on input, and an
observed output o, all we need for CompQIF1 and CompQIF2 (deterministic case for
the latter) is the enumeration of preP(o), the input values consistent with o. Also, we
can forget the probability of a choice command and regard it just as a nondeterministic
choice. Especially when input values are uniformly distributed, only the number of
elements of preP(o) is needed.
In the remainder of Section 4, we assume input values are uniformly distributed for
simplicity. Fig. 3 illustrates the calculation flow using model counting. The basic idea is
similar to other existing QIF analysis tools based on model counting, namely, (1) feeding
a target C program into CBMC [29]; (2) getting a Boolean formula ϕ equivalent to the
source program in terms of constraints among variables in the program; (3) feeding ϕ
into a projected model counter that can count the models with respect to projection on
variables of interest; and (5) getting the result. The only difference of this framework
from existing ones is (4), augmenting information about an observed output value o into
the Boolean formula ϕ so that each model corresponds to an input value which produces
o. The set of the obtained models is exactly the pre-image of o.
CBMC
(C Bounded
Model Checker)
C
source file
Boolean
formula 
Observed
output
value o
Projected
model counter
Size of
o's preimage
Tool for computing leakage
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Fig. 3. Reduction of computing dynamic leakage to model counting
Pluggability There are several parts in the framework above that can be flexibly changed
to utilize the strength of different tools and/or approaches. Firstly, the projected model
counter at (5) could be either a projected ]SAT solver (e.g., SharpCDCL) or a ]SMT
solver (e.g., aZ3). Consequently, a formula at (3) could be either a SAT constraints
(e.g., a Boolean formula in DIMACS format) or a SMT constraints (e.g., a formula in
SMTLIB format) generated by CBMC. Moreover, this framework can be extended to
different programming languages other than C, such as Java, having JPF [26] and KEY
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[12] as two well-known counterparts of CBMC. In the next section, we are showing
experimental results in which we tried several set-ups of tools in this framework to
observe the differences.
5 Experiments
We conducted some experiments to investigate the flexibility of the framework to reduce
computing dynamic leakage tomodel counting introduced in the previous section, aswell
as the scalability of this method. For the simplicity to achieve this purpose, we restricted
to calculate dynamic leakage for deterministic programswith uniformly distributed input.
Toward the analysis inmore general cases and possibilities on performance improvement,
we give some discussion and leave it as one of future work.
5.1 Overview
All experiments were done in a same PC with the following specification: core i7-
6500U, CPU@2.5GHz x 4, 8GB RAM, Ubuntu 18.04 64 bits. We set one hour as
time-out and interrupted execution whenever the running time exceeds this duration.
The model counters we used are described below.
– aZ3: a ]SMT solver developed by Phan et al. [22], which is built on top of the
state-of-the-art SMT solver Z3. We used an improved version of aZ3 which is
developed by Nakashima et al. [21]. It allows specifying variables of interest, which
is equivalent to projection in SAT-based model counter.
– SharpCDCL: a ]SAT solver with capability of projected counting based on Conflict-
Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) [33]. The tool finds a new projected model and
then adds a clause blocking to find the samemodel again. It enumerates all projected
models by repeating that.
– DSharp-p: another ]SAT solver based on d-DNNF format [20]. The tool first trans-
lates a given formula into d-DNNF format. It is known that, once given a d-DNNF
format of constraints, it takes only linear time to the size of the formula to count
models of those constraints. We used an extended version with the capability of
projected counting which is added by Klebanov et al. [15,30].
– GPMC: a projected model counter built on top of the SAT solver glucose [31], in
which component analysis and caching used in the model counter SharpSAT are
implemented [32].
The benchmarks are taken from previous researches about QIF analysis with most of
them are taken from benchmarks of aZ3 [22], except bin_search32.c which is taken
from [18]. The difference between the ordinary QIF analysis and dynamic leakage
quantification is that the former is not interested in an observed output value, but the
latter is. Therefore, for the purpose of these experiments, we augmented the original
benchmarks with additional information about concrete values of public output (public
input also if there is some). Because we assume deterministic programs with uniformly
distributed input, QIF1(o) = QIF2(o) = log |S ||preP (o) | by Theorem 1. Hence, without
loss of precision in comparison, we consider counting preP(o) as the final goal of these
experiments.
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5.2 Results
Table 2 shows execution time of model counting based on the four different model
counters, in which t/o indicates that the experiment was interrupted because of time-
out and - means the counter gave a wrong answer (i.e., only DSharp-p miscounted for
UNSAT cases, probably because the tool does assume input formula to be satisfiable).
By eliminating parsing time from the comparison, we measured only time needed to
count models.
According to the experimental results, aZ3-based model counting did not win the
fastest for any benchmark, and moreover its execution time is always at least ten times
slower than the best. On the other hand, DSharp-p seems to take much time to translate
formulas into d-DNNF format for dining6/50.c and grade.c, and gave wrong answers for
mix_duplicate.c and sanity_check.c, the number of models of which are 0, i.e., unsat-
isfiable. By and large, aZ3 and DSharp-p can hardly take advantage to the other tools,
SharpCDCL and GPMC, in dynamic leakage quantification. Though SharpCDCLwon 8
out of 14 benchmarks, the difference between the tools in those cases are not significant,
yet the execution times are too short that it can be fluctuated by insignificant parameters.
Therefore, it is better to look at long run benchmarks, grade.c and masked_copy.c. In
both cases, GPMC won by 9.7 times and 287.9 times respectively. The execution times
as well as the difference in those two cases are significant. We also noticed that, those
two cases have 65,536 and 65 models, which are the two biggest counts among the
benchmarks. The more the number of the models is, the bigger is the difference between
execution times of GPMC and SharpCDCL. Hence, we can empirically conclude that
GPMC-based works much better than SharpCDCL-based in cases the number of models
is large, while not so worse in other cases.
By implementing the prototype, we reaffirmed the possibility of automatically com-
puting QIF1 and QIF2. Speaking of scalability, despite of small LOC (Lines of Code),
there is still the case of grade.c (48 lines) for which all settings take longer than one
minute, a very long time from the viewpoint of runtime analysis, to count models. There
are several directions to improve the current performance which we leave as one of fu-
ture work. First, because dynamic leakage should be calculated repeatedly for different
observed outputs but a same program, we can leverage such an advantage of d-DNNF
that while transforming to a d-DNNF format takes time, the model counting can be done
in linear time once a d-DNNF format is obtained. That is, we generate merely once in ad-
vance a d-DNNF format of the constraints representing the program under analysis, then
each time an observed output value is given, we make only small modification and count
models in linear time to the size of the constraints. The difficulty of this direction lies in
how to augment the information of observed output to the generated d-DNNF without
breaking its d-DNNF structure. Another direction is to loose the required precision to
accept approximate count. This could be done by counting on existing approximate
model counters.
5.3 Toward general cases
In order to calculate QIF1 andQIF2 for a probabilistic programwith a non-uniform input
distribution, we must identify projected models of the Boolean formula, rather than the
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Table 2. Counting result and execution time (ms) of different settings
Benchmark Count aZ3 SharpCDCL DSharp-p GPMC
bin_search32 1 781 37 52 9
crc8 32 303 11 31 36
crc32 8 294 8 32 32
dining6 6 1,305 44 t/o 49
dining50 50 t/o 199 t/o 193
electronic_purse 5 525 137 9,909 223
grade 65 2,705,934 910,655 t/o 93,445
implicit_flow 1 253 15 31 33
masked_copy 65,536 t/o 9,214 30 32
mix_duplicate 0 241 12 - 4
population_count 32 477 19 37 34
sanity_check 0 247 13 - 8
sum_query 3 310 20 31 35
ten_random_outputs 1 249 18 32 34
number of the models, to obtain the probabilities determined by them in general. GPMC,
specialized formodel counting, does not compute thewhole part of eachmodel explicitly.
Hence, GPMC is not appropriate for a calculation of the probability depending on the
concrete models. On the other hand, sharpCDCL basically enumerates all projected
models, and thus we think we can extend it as follows to compute QIF1 and QIF2 in
general cases.
To calculate QIF1 for a probabilistic program with a non-uniform input distribution,
we can replace each probabilistic choice in a give program with a non-deterministic
choice as stated in Section 4, and then enumerate projected models with respect to the
input variables, summing up the probabilities of the corresponding input values.
As for QIF2, we have to calculate not only the probabilities of possible input values
but also those of possible execution paths reachable to the observed output. To achieve
this, in addition to the replacement of probabilistic choices with non-deterministic
choices, we may insert variables to remember which branch is chosen at each of the non-
deterministic choices. Then, given a projected model of the Boolean formula generated
from the modified source code with respect to the input variables and the additional
choice variables, we can get to know a possible input value and an execution path from
the projected model. For a possible input value s, p(o|s) is the sum of the probabilities
of all possible execution paths from s to the observed o.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we summarize three requirements as criteria for reasonable dynamic
leakage definitions to follow. Also we defined two novel ones both of which satisfy
all the criteria and have understandable explanations of the background perspectives.
Besides giving proof of some of their characteristics, we gave results on the hardness
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of computing dynamic leakage under those definitions for three classes of Boolean pro-
grams, including loop-free, while and recursive. Despite of the hardness, we introduced
a framework to reduce the problems to model counting, which gets much attention from
researchers from various fields of interest. Based on that framework, we implemented
a prototype and conducted some experiments to verify flexibility and scalability of the
framework. Lastly, we gave some discussion on how to improve the performance and
the whole picture of computing dynamic leakage in general cases.
Beyond this paper, we leave the following as future work: (1) utilizing the strength of
d-DNNF format to improve calculation performance, (2) approaching those problems
in terms of approximated calculation and (3) tackling the problems under more general
assumptions.
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